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International Framework Agreements (IFAs) represent a still small but growing and 
particularly interesting contribution to the global regulation of employment relations. 
IFAs enable global union federations (GUFs) to become actively involved in co-designing 
employment relations within transnational corporations (TNCs) and their global 
production networks. Based upon theoretical insights into the challenges of transferring 
practices in and across organizations, we present and discuss a model of practice transfer 
for global production networks based on empirical data from a content analysis of IFAs 
and from interviews with representatives of TNCs, GUFs, and other experts. Our study 
contributes to an organizational theory of practice transfer. But more importantly, it 
aims at a better integration of IHRM and international industrial relations by looking 
more closely at the particular role of GUFs as external actors. 
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Introduction
Over the past two decades, Transnational Corporations (TNC) have been a major force 
in globalizing production. While numerous campaigns have heightened public aware-
ness of the negative impacts of this development on working conditions, only limited 
attention has been paid to an equally important and ongoing process to regulate employ-
ment relations on a global scale through International Framework Agreements (IFAs). In 
contrast to unilateral Codes of Conduct (Waddock, 2008), IFAs are based on union rec-
ognition by TNC management at headquarter (HQ) level. By the end of 2008, 72 such 
agreements had been signed by the central management of a TNC and a Global Union 
Federation (GUF). As a joint statement of commitment, an IFA is intended to secure 
practices that ensure compliance with basic labour standards, in particular with the core 
labour standards1 established by the International Labour Organization’s Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (ILO, 1998). For this reason, we argue that 
IFAs present an exemplary, but so far only partially explored, case of external actor 
involvement in the company-specific internal transfer of particular practices of interna-
tional human resource management (IHRM), namely, practices at the intersection of 
employment relations and corporate social responsibility (CSR).
IFAs are intended to function as a joint policy instrument. But while publications on 
IFAs as a policy instrument of organized labour abound (e.g. Hammer, 2005; Müller et 
al., 2008; Papadakis, 2008; Schömann et al., 2008; Stevis 2010; Tørres and Gunnes, 
2003; Wills, 2002), much less attention has been given to management’s role and to 
(inter-)organizational issues in regard to this topic. In this article, we address the issue of 
IFAs as a case of external actor involvement in the company-specific transfer of IHRM 
practices. Such a fresh look will not only sharpen the organizational perspective on IFAs 
and TNCs, but will also contribute empirically to strengthening our understanding of 
employee voice in IHRM and of the links to research in industrial relations.
Most recently, the involvement of external actors has entered the debate over practice 
transfer owing to empirical results indicating a special role of external actors in shaping 
business behaviour in general, and affecting the transfer of practices in particular 
(Collings, 2008; Greer and Hauptmeier, 2008; Preuss et al., 2009). Nevertheless, how 
exactly external actors are involved in the process of practice transfer, and what their 
special impact on the initiation of this process is, remain largely unclear. In contrast to 
several other studies (e.g. Bartley, 2007; Scherer and Smid, 2000), our research investi-
gates how instead of why transfers of more decent work practices are initiated. More 
specifically we ask how organized representatives of labour, not only external but also 
internal, influence the initiation of the transfer of HRM practices within TNCs and their 
global production networks. By answering this question, we reintroduce a core idea of 
industrial relations research, namely the role of conflicts of interest and mechanisms of 
their resolution, into IHRM in general and the transfer of practices within and beyond 
TNCs in particular. Although IFAs feature a prominent role for unions and their impact 
on practices at the intersection of employment relations and CSR, they also represent an 
interesting case for external actors who might wish to influence other corporate policies 
and management initiatives on a global scale.
Theoretically, we draw on the practice transfer model that Szulanski (1996, 2000) 
developed and applied to TNCs (Jensen and Szulanski, 2004), but that has been largely 
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neglected by IHRM research. For our purpose, the main virtue of this model is that it 
conceptualizes the basic properties of the transfer of practices as an organizational proc-
ess in which sources and recipients need to overcome organizational stickiness in order 
to transfer practices as a ‘distinct experience’ of knowledge exchange (Szulanski, 2000: 
17). Although we agree with Szulanski’s view that transfers must be analysed as proc-
esses, we argue in favour of a two-fold refinement of his model as his framing of such 
processes appears to be too narrow in the case of IFAs. First, we emphasize the role of 
both internal and external actors additional to management in the initiation (and the 
overall) process of a practice transfer. This refinement acknowledges the negotiation 
processes that take place between management and the additional actors involved to 
actually produce a decision to transfer a practice. Second, Szulanski’s single enterprise 
model of transfer needs to be extended beyond the boundaries of a TNC to capture and 
reflect on the inter-organizational realities of global production networks. 
After relating our approach to the debate on practice transfer in the IHRM literature, 
we present this refined model of practice transfer. Next, we describe our methodology 
and report empirical findings for four TNCs that have concluded IFAs. Supplemented by 
a document analysis of the content of 72 IFAs as well as interviews with managers from 
HRM departments of other TNCs, GUF officials, local unions, and experts, our findings 
reveal why the process stage of initiation needs to be analysed more thoroughly than in 
Szulanski’s original model. This is because involving an external actor with different 
interests adds new sources of initiation stickiness to those already identified by Szulanski. 
In this early phase of the process, negotiations may change the conditions for later imple-
mentation and diffusion in the TNC and its global production network. Thus, the actor 
constellation in the formation of a practice affects the responsibilities assigned initially 
to each party of the agreement, the organizational forms established to support and moni-
tor the transfer, and the definition of its boundary of application. Following the analysis 
of the initiation phase of practice transfer, we offer a brief review of initial case handling 
experiences. As these first cases indicate, the actor constellation, the process, and the 
outcome of the initiation phase have a crucial impact on the subsequent implementation 
of HRM practices. We conclude with a summary of the contributions of our study to a 
conception of IHRM that takes the role of global union federations as external actors 
seriously.
Transfer of practices within TNCs and beyond: An extended 
model
Transfer of management practices in HQ-subsidiary relationships has become a major 
topic of the IHRM literature (and management research in general) (Brewster et al., 
2008; Edwards et al., 2007; Tempel and Walgenbach, 2007), because it might reveal 
some insight about how institutionalization processes operate across organizational sub-
systems and whether a diversity of practices or, by contrast, an isomorphism according 
to one ‘dominant’ or ‘best’ practice, will prevail within a given TNC and its global pro-
duction networks (Geppert et al., 2006; Pudelko and Harzing, 2007). The issues covered 
range from implementation of various HRM policies such as financial participation, 
diversity management, or union recognition and non-unionism (Brewster et al., 2008; 
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Ferner et al., 2004, 2005; Tempel et al., 2006) to such broader issues as internationalization 
strategies and corporate control (Harzing and Sorge, 2003). 
Practice transfer in the IHRM literature 
In general, practices are recurrent actions whose reproduction is made more likely by the 
help of routines, rules, procedures, and similar institutions (Giddens, 1984). Within trans-
national management processes, practices usually originate at a central ‘source’ (i.e. HQ 
management) and are transferred to subsystems of a global production network (i.e. local 
subsidiaries and suppliers) located in different institutional environments. In recent 
years, the debate in the international management literature over the divergence/conver-
gence dichotomy of TNCs’ business models and management practices has shown that 
traditional expectations about TNCs’ capacity and capability to manage all of their sub-
sidiaries in a similar way are confronted by the reality of limited HQ influence (Brewster 
et al., 2008; Dörrenbächer and Geppert, 2006; Geppert and Williams, 2006; Harzing and 
Sorge, 2003). A growing body of research from different perspectives, i.e. the business 
systems approach, organizational neo-institutionalism, and micro-politics has shown 
why convergence toward one model of business conduct, comprised of one distinct set 
of practices in various management functions, is unlikely to be observed empirically 
(Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008; Dörrenbächer and Geppert, 2006; Edwards and Rees, 
2006; Edwards et al., 1999; Geppert and Williams, 2006; Kostova et al., 2008; McSweeney 
et al., 2008; see Geppert et al., 2006, for a summary).
Although we acknowledge the fundamental contributions of this research in general – 
and the extensive case study research on employment relations and IHRM conducted by 
Almond, Ferner, Edwards, Temple and others (e.g. Ferner et al., 2004, 2005; Ferner and 
Almond, 2006) in particular – to understanding implementation induced divergences in 
practices across countries, the focus of our article is on an aspect of the transfer of prac-
tice that this research has insufficiently addressed. Our aim is to show how the involve-
ment of multiple actors initiates a process that may lead to the transfer of practices and 
the implementation of labour standards. As has been argued more generally elsewhere 
(Geppert et al., 2006; Hassel, 2008; Levy, 2008), TNCs are increasingly involved in 
global regulation and institution-building, processes in which management most defi-
nitely must deal with additional actors. With IFAs, which we regard to be a potentially 
significant element in the globalization of labour standards, such actors may be (internal) 
employee representatives (Preuss et al., 2009) or (external) trade unions. 
Practice transfer according to Szulanski’s model
The conclusion of an IFA is a case of external actor influence at the HQ level. For ana-
lytical purposes, we use the process-oriented approach of Szulanski (1996, 2000) as a 
starting point as this, more than most studies in IHRM, focuses on the procedural and 
systemic properties of the transfer process. However, we are aware of the fact that owing 
to the focus of this approach (at least in its earlier versions) on the intra-organizational 
aspects of the transfer process, influences of institutional distances were neglected to a 
certain extent (for an incorporation of institutional distances in the argument, see Jensen 
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and Szulanski, 2004). For example, national differences in labour law, cultural diversity 
in cognitive attitudes, and locally idiosyncratic political struggles all play a role in the 
formation and transfer of labour-related management practices that are not accounted for 
in the original model (for attempts to make these aspects an explicit starting point for 
analysis see Geppert and Williams, 2006; Kostova et al., 2008; McSweeney et al., 2008). 
Nevertheless, we stick to this approach as it allows us to explore in more detail at which 
points in the process the (political) influence of external actors might play a role in initi-
ating the transfer of practices. 
According to Szulanski (2000), the transfer of any practice, including the kind involv-
ing external actors, occurs between a source and a recipient and is only completed when 
the recipient is able to at least partially replicate, reconstruct, and integrate a practice 
according to a certain template, benchmark or standard. To underline the process charac-
ter of practice transfer, Szulanski’s model consists of four phases: initiation, implementa-
tion, ramp-up, and integration. The phase of initiation – which is the focus of this article 
– starts with uncovering possible gaps, continues with finding and defining a practice to 
be transferred as a solution, and ends with the actual decision to transfer this practice. 
The initiation phase sets the stage for the subsequent phases and, as such, its connection 
to them is vital for local adoption, adaptation, and consecutive reproduction.
Usually the transfer process is exposed to several institutional and organizational bar-
riers in each phase of the transfer that Szulanski summarizes under the rubric of ‘organi-
zational stickiness’ (Szulanski, 2000: 12). On a general level, stickiness emerges from 
several sources, both systemic and actor-related, which reduce the ability of a source to 
transfer and impede the capability of a recipient to replicate a given practice. These 
sources include inherent features of the practice itself, but also agents’ motivations and 
interests, the quality of the transfer relationship, and the organizational context. 
Practice transfer in an extended Szulanski model
In our extension of Szulanski’s model, we specify additional factors of stickiness result-
ing from the contested nature of the transfer of labour-related practices (Table 1). The 
first point of extension is based on considering the constellation of actors with respect to 
IHRM policies of TNCs. Szulanski’s model infers a kind of one-on-one relationship 
between HQs (source) and subsidiary (recipient), with each being presented as a differ-
ent part of an otherwise homogeneous entity, i.e. management. As a consequence, he 
concentrates on those forms of stickiness with which management is confronted in iden-
tifying gaps and defining possible solutions. In our extension, the initiation stage of the 
transfer process involves additional actors, in the case of IFAs, both external and internal 
ones. Our special focus is on GUFs as an external actor, because without the signature of 
a GUF representative, there would be no IFA. As documented in their programmatic 
statements, GUFs have identified TNC labour relations as an important strategic lever-
age point to (re-) gain influence on the global organization of production by negotiating 
a cross-border IFA of recognized norms, principles and procedures that is supplemental 
to national level bargaining and legal provisions (Hammer, 2005; Müller et al., 2008; 
Papadakis, 2008). GUFs see IFAs as a means for securing their own recognition, creating 
space for organizing at the local level, and extending recognition of the core labour 
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standards of the ILO (Brandl, 2006; Croucher and Cotton, 2009; Stevis, 2010). As such, 
there is the clear ambition of the GUFs to influence HRM practices of TNCs throughout 
global production networks. As a result, the initiation stage of the transfer of practices 
definitely becomes more complex than in a unilaterally devised management policy. 
As a second and related point of extension we include global production networks as 
the relevant, and in several respects more ‘heterarchical’ (Hedlund, 1986), background 
structure for the whole process of IFA negotiations by recognizing the existence of local 
actors, their possible input, and their relationship to HQs. As TNCs bridge spatial, insti-
tutional, and organizational distances, they evolve into globally dispersed production 
networks, with complex supply chains and different, sometimes even plural, forms of 
formal governance: hierarchy, market, and hybrid (Bair, 2008; Garcia-Pont et al., 2009; 
Gereffi et al., 2005; Lane, 2008). However, Szulanski’s model does not capture these 
networked configurations despite their apparent relevance for the globalization of pro-
duction in general, and, especially in regard to our topic, for setting labour standards and 
establishing union recognition. Within the boundaries of a global production network, it 
may be argued that ‘obligational contractual relations’ (Sako, 1992) or ‘relational con-
tracting’ (Macneil, 1978), at least if compared with arm’s-length market relations, may 
be better at facilitating the improvement of employment conditions and relations (Fichter 
and Sydow, 2002; Frenkel, 2001; Frenkel and Kim, 2004; Xue, 2008). But one can also 
postulate a declining degree in labour standards’ coverage with increasing distance from 
the core of a TNC’s operation (Palpacuer, 2008; Xue, 2008). In this sense, GUFs aim to 
influence HQ management to take responsibility for the working conditions at 
the periphery of global production networks as well. As a consequence of the particular 
role GUFs aim to play and suppliers actually do play, the intra-organizational sources 
of stickiness need to be complemented by extending the model to include inter- 
organizational ones. 
Table 1 summarizes our extensions to the model of practice transfer in global produc-
tion networks in regard to the role of additional actors. In the first sub-stage, it is the 
GUFs that push the identification of gaps in labour standards in the periphery of global 
production networks. In the second sub-stage it is again the GUFs as external actors that 
– on their own or via intermediate channels of influence like co-determination or home 
country union representation – may force management into negotiations over global 
labour practices, thereby altering the sequence of the initiation phase compared with a 
situation of managerial unilateralism. From these two extensions – and their relatedness 
to the variety of inter-organizational relations in global production networks – there fol-
lows a negotiation process of joint decision-making to formally define a solution that 
actors on both sides, labour and management, can agree on for transfer. In all three sub-
stages GUFs and their representatives are involved with all their organizational and indi-
vidual ‘knowledgeability’ (Giddens, 1984) 
In essence, we maintain that the way the initiation process unfolds has a strong impact 
on its success. We define a successful initiation of IFA related practice transfer as the 
establishment of a viable conflict resolution mechanism. This is a necessary precondition 
for an enduring and successful implementation of better working practices at the local 
level. A conflict resolution mechanism is viable if it enables alleged violations to be fed 
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back into negotiation processes at the HQ level, if its procedural conditions allow for the 
resolution of such cases, and if the procedure is open to possible (re-)negotiation and 
modification in light of implementation practice at the local level. Our assessment of the 
actor-related and systemic contributing factors in the sub-stages provides a sufficient 
basis for judging the viability of the agreed conflict resolution mechanisms. 
Research setting and methodology
Our analysis of the initiation stage draws on both primary and secondary sources, which 
we have used, first of all, as a basis for understanding and evaluating the IFA process 
across our whole sample of 72 TNCs. In a second step, we have directed our analysis of 
these sources in particular to the four case studies presented below, which illustrate the 
initiation phase of the transfer of practice and the subsequently recurrent issues around 
the handling of violations. 
Data collection and analysis 
Our primary sources include both interviews and documents. Between November 2008 
and December 2009 we conducted 49 semi-structured interviews with key actors from 
TNCs (management, works councils) and from unions (GUFs, home country trade unions) 
directly involved in IFA initiation processes. Each of these interviews averaged 45 min-
utes. With few exceptions, the interviews were recorded and transcribed. Furthermore, we 
completed some two dozen background interviews of a similar length with actors in the 
field of international labour relations. These included representatives from civil society 
organizations, employer associations, and academic experts on national industrial rela-
tions systems, all of whom are indirectly engaged in IFA-related processes.
Second, we carried out a comprehensive content analysis of all 72 IFAs, in which we 
could identify 125 substantive and procedural IFA characteristics that we divided into 
four general categories, i.e. actors identified by signatures, substance distinguished by 
Table 1 Initiation of practice transfer in global production networks
Initiation phase: sub-stages Sources of stickiness 
(Szulanski) 
Sources of stickiness (extended 
model)
Identifying a gap Taken-for-granted beliefs 
and entrenched habits
Identification of gap by external 
actor initiative
Define a possible solution Problem-oriented search, 
ambiguous relationships 
between means and ends
Negotiation with external and 
internal actors
Decision to transfer Unilateral decision,  
(Dis-)Trust in reliability 
and motivation of source 
and recipient
Joint decision-making with 
external actor
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ILO standards and itemized topics, procedures defined by monitoring bodies and imple-
mentation measures, and scope in terms of the extension to subsidiaries and suppliers. 
We also reviewed value statement in the preambles. Table 2 gives examples of the kinds 
of quotations we used for a process-oriented analysis of the data. 
To extend our understanding of the organizational and institutional environment as 
being conducive or detrimental to the viability of collective conflict resolution as for-
mally specified in IFAs, we collected and reviewed elementary data both on TNCs and 
their operations (including reports on social responsibility) and on GUFs, as well as on 
the relevant institutional environment of the country of origin and the host country. 
Finally, the authors were able to participate in several workshops, discussions, and meet-
ings in which union and employee representatives, and managers, either engaged in IFA 
related activities or reflected on their approach to IFAs.
Case selection and analysis
In addition to collection and analysis of more general data, we have conducted a com-
parative case study for understanding the practices of transfer and the (inter-)organiza-
tional stickiness of the process in more detail (see Table 3 for an overview). Our 
reconstruction of the sequence of events, however stylized and reduced for presentation, 
provides a process analysis unattainable by a detailed review of IFA documents alone. 
Furthermore, each case was submitted to ‘triangulation’ (Jick, 1979) based on the fol-
lowing sources: our interviews with the HQ management and the labour side from our 
four cases provide insights on the first initiative and on the negotiations; second, we have 
the IFA texts to analyse the formal properties of the decision to transfer; and third, we 
use our additional interviews from the other cases to place the four selected cases within 
the larger field of IFA-related activities and within the wider range of IFAs’ initiation 
processes. Similarly, we occasionally draw on our content analysis of all 72 agreements 
as well as on our secondary data for comparison.
In selecting the four TNCs, our first step was to eliminate those TNCs from our sam-
ple of 72 IFAs that did not meet the following three criteria: The TNC has a signed IFA 
with one of four GUFs2 that together, have concluded 89 percent of all IFAs; it is based 
in continental Europe or Scandinavia (85% of all TNC with IFAs), which is indicative 
of a European style of HRM policies and labour relations at the HQ level; and it has 
production facilities or subsidiaries in Brazil, India, Turkey, and the USA. We have 
chosen these countries because of their relevance for the changing pattern of the global 
division of labour. Together with China and Russia, Brazil and India belong to a group 
of countries that has a growing political and economical importance in the world econ-
omy. The USA is the second largest regional economy in the world (Subacchi, 2008) 
and a prime focus of manufacturing investments among our sample TNCs. Apart from 
its above average economic growth rates, Turkey is of particular regional importance 
for European TNCs, owing to the process of European integration. For very different 
reasons, the situation of compliance with core labour standards is a difficult problem in 
all four countries, having to do with factors such as contentious local industrial rela-
tions, peculiarities in national labour law and the impact of the informal economy. 
Taken together, it is fair to say that policies that fail in these countries are not likely to 
succeed in other places.
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These criteria yielded a group of 12 TNCs, three per GUF. Based on information from 
the GUFs and from employer sources, we added one TNC to each GUF group as a control 
case. For these 16 TNCs we interviewed 15 managers, mostly from HRM departments or 
Table 2. Content analysis of interviews and IFAs’ texts












‘We as employee representatives wanted it [the 
IFA]. The idea came definitely from us. Initially, the 
management side reacted reluctantly, reacted with 
refusal. Then, it fitted into our plans that the CEO 
signed the global compact without having informed 
anyone before.’ (MetalCorp employee rep)
‘We strongly believe as ICEM that the general 
secretary has a mandate to reach such  











‘It cannot be easy with any company to negotiate 
because from the company side when you accept 
any demand from the union, it would have 
reflections in their activities, in their organizing, 
in their structure, and in terms of profits.’ 
(ChemCorp, GUF rep) 
‘ServiceCorp demanded from unions to inform 
management first, before a case is taken to a labor 
court, to have an internal negotiation on such 











‘ChemCorp and ICEM share the same 
commitment to an in-depth and balanced dialog 
between labor and management. This dialog (…) 
takes place through various employee forums 
as well as regular negotiations with employee 
representatives.’ (ChemCorp IFA)
‘ResourceCorp will seek to use the services 
of those trading partners, subcontractors, and 
suppliers, which recognize and implement the 
principles listed below.’ (Resource Corp IFA)
‘MetalCorp respects the right to collective 
bargaining. (…) Freedom of association will be 
granted even in those countries in which freedom 












‘There have been a number of issues directly 
related to [ResourceCorp] that have been brought 
up. Some of them have been solved satisfactorily, 
some of them haven’t.’ (ResourceCorp GUF rep)
‘However, scandals or concrete violations of  
labor standards have not been reported from the 
1990s to today.’ (ServiceCorp man rep)
608  Human Relations 64(4)
HRM related functions in sourcing and CSR departments. In addition, we have 
completed 25 interviews with the actors involved on the labour side. These include GUF 
officials, national union representatives or spokespersons of European/world works 
councils. This heterogeneity on the labour side reflects the different circumstances under 
which IFAs are negotiated (see below). By this approach, we completed 11 matches, i.e. 
11 TNCs for which we have interviews on both sides. In a final step, we selected one case 
from each GUF group for a more in-depth analysis: MetalCorp (IMF), ResourceCorp 
(BWI/ICEM), ChemCorp (ICEM), and ServiceCorp (UNI). For each of them we have 
conducted two to five interviews, at least one interview for each group of respondents, 
i.e. management and labour.
Table 3 provides an overview of the four corporations. All of them organize their 
production in networks on a global scale, as do all TNC in our sample.3 However, beyond 
representing different sectors, the four corporations selected vary in regard to the struc-
ture of their global operations. While all four are examples of highly complex systems of 
subsidiaries, suppliers, joint ventures, and contractors spanning many institutionally and 
culturally diverse settings, they do differ in their degree of heterarchy. A ‘heterarchical’ 
TNC is characterized by subsidiaries with a significant amount of autonomy and the abil-
ity to influence HQ policies and practices (Hedlund, 1986). The most heterarchic TNC is 
ResourceCorp, followed by ServiceCorp, whereas MetalCorp and ChemCorp represent 
more centralized configuration of production networks. Moreover, each corporation rep-
resents a different size class of TNC. ServiceCorp is by far the largest, MetalCorp is also 
comparatively large, while ResourceCorp is very average-sized and ChemCorp is among 
the smallest.


















































438,000 62 Business units 
by region
Minor role of 
subcontracting
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All four TNC are headquartered in Europe and have European works councils. Under 
the leadership of a corporate HQ (group management), business units are organized 
along product divisions or segments, except at ServiceCorp, in which legally independ-
ent business units are grouped by country/region. At ServiceCorp, subcontracting is neg-
ligible, whereas it is used extensively throughout the global operations of ResourceCorp, 
amounting to approximately one third of its officially reported workforce. MetalCorp is 
a major OEM with many suppliers (around 35,000), the most important ones have the 
status of system suppliers that are integrated by relational contracting. In this respect 
ChemCorp is somewhere in the middle between ResourceCorp and MetalCorp. 
All four TNCs are confronted by different types of actors and strategies on the union 
side: While all of the four GUFs involved in our cases are organized along industry or 
sectoral lines, with affiliates in over 100 countries and aggregate memberships ranging 
between 12 and 25 million workers, they have distinct strategy preferences with respect 
to IFAs that we would characterize as follows: ‘organizing’ (UNI), ‘countervailing 
power’ (IMF), ‘social dialogue’ (ICEM), and a ‘mixture’ of organizing and social dia-
logue (BWI). 
MetalCorp negotiates with the IMF, which can build on many national/local affili-
ated unions with high membership densities in core firms of its industry domain and, 
at least in many continental European firms, can make use of an influential position 
inside a given TNC owing to (European) works councils (Brandl, 2006). Coordinating 
with these two actors, the IMF is able to pursue a ‘countervailing power’ strategy in 
which national unions at HQ and works councils initiate and negotiate IFAs under the 
formal responsibility and leadership of the IMF (critical of this approach from a union 
perspective: Herrnstadt, 2007). As with MetalCorp, those TNCs with a world works 
council have also been among the first targets of IFA negotiations (Platzer and Müller, 
2009: 120).
ResourceCorp is confronted with a more complex situation. Its major negotiation 
partner is the BWI that follows a mixed policy of a ‘social dialogue/organizing’ type 
depending on whether the construction or the woodworking segment of its jurisdiction is 
relevant (Hellmann, 2007). Since ResourceCorp’s business is in construction materials, 
which is dependent on natural resource exploitation, in many countries its employees are 
represented by unions affiliated to ICEM. For this reason, ICEM joined the IFA negotia-
tions (see below). 
ChemCorp also negotiates with ICEM. Its ‘social dialogue’ approach is embodied in 
an increased focus on the pursuit of ‘Global Framework Agreements’ and buttressed by 
a considerable number of regional union networks worldwide, particularly in Latin 
America (Cumbers et al., 2008). Although ICEM also uses union representatives at the 
HQ as door-openers to management, it insists on its sole responsibility and mandate to 
negotiate IFAs. This is the case with ChemCorp.
Finally, ServiceCorp is confronted by UNI, which defines itself as a ‘campaign union’ 
(Union Network International, 2001: 129) and uses IFAs in the context of what we clas-
sify as an ‘organizing strategy’. Operating in a domain of widespread employer disdain 
for unions, and lacking formalized and institutionalized channels of influence in many 
TNCs, UNI mobilizes its affiliates globally to exert public pressure on TNCs for negotia-
tions over union rights and recognition.
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Initiation of practice transfer within TNCs and beyond: 
Empirical insights 
The following presentation of our empirical evidence follows the sub-stages of the 
initiation phase and will emphasize the dual extensions of Szulanski’s model we have 
proposed, i.e. the involvement of external (and internal) actors additional to manage-
ment and the extension of the scope of practice transfer beyond the legal boundaries 
of the TNC. Our aim is to show how GUFs as external actors initiated IFAs by uncov-
ering gaps in TNCs’ adherence to labour standards, how they interacted with manage-
ment in negotiations to define IFAs as a solution to closing these gaps, and how they 
influenced the practices to be implemented along with the monitoring mechanisms 
and the extent of supplier inclusion. Table 4 summarizes the results with respect to our 
four case studies.
Taking the initiative: GUFs as external initiators 
By ‘finding the gap’ we are referring to a process of uncovering discrepancies between 
an intended practice, in this case a normative level of labour standards, and the actual 
practices throughout a global production network. Based on Szulanski’s considerations 
in which taken-for-granted beliefs and entrenched habits impede the identification of a 
gap internally, it is probably not surprising that uncovering such a gap and designating it 
as a problem is done by an external actor. Exceptions, such as the ChemCorp case, are 
owing to the anomalous circumstance that the responsible top manager is a former trade 
union official, who pushes for a well-developed holistic CSR program and cooperative 
labour relations at HQ. In raising the issue of the existence of a gap, labour’s approaches 
have been varied, depending on the particular constellation of actors and their strategic 
priorities. Whereas the internal employee representative body (works council) initiated 
the process at MetalCorp, the works councils at both ResourceCorp and ServiceCorp had 
only a passive role. Among the external actors, both the GUF and the national union were 
in supporting roles in the MetalCorp case. In contrast, it was the personal initiative of a 
leading BWI official that got the process started at ResourceCorp, and at ChemCorp, the 
GUF was the sole actor on the labour side. In the case of ServiceCorp, UNI took the lead 
in coordinating national union pressure on management to recognize the gap and enter 
into negotiations. 
In contrast to the diversity of organizational representation on labour’s side,4 manage-
ment is a far more homogeneous actor. Only HQ management, first and foremost repre-
sented by managers of central HRM,5 is directly involved in negotiating IFAs. In all of 
our interviews with managers we recorded different degrees of resistance to labour’s 
initiatives in this sub-stage, ranging from mere reluctance up to – at the beginning – out-
right refusal to bargain. Union respondents repeatedly complained about the reservation 
on the part of management to enter into negotiations and actively contribute to reaching 
an agreement. For their part, many of our management respondents were clearly inter-
ested in limiting external voice in the definition of corporate standards. They argued that 
their company’s CSR initiatives already fulfilled the goal of transferring decent labour 
standards. 
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Despite such initial resistance on the management side, our selected cases show that 
the process can be initiated and developed. Drawing on our four cases, we find that ini-
tiation may be facilitated by a long record of cooperative industrial relations at the HQ 
level and an institutional environment in support of internal conflict resolution 
(MetalCorp, ChemCorp). In the case of ServiceCorp, management came to recognize the 
role of union voice and involvement as part of its corporate culture and the strategic 
priorities of the corporation’s business model (differentiation by quality). ResourceCorp, 
by contrast, is more of the voluntaristic variety in which commitment to CSR, including 
labour-related measures, is primarily aimed at risk reduction and issue management. For 
this company, reputation and public relations are of priority concern. 
Defining the practice to be transferred: The negotiation process
After agreement is reached about the existence of a ‘gap’, the second stage of the initia-
tion phase commences. The duration of this stage differed considerably among the TNCs 
involved. According to our union respondents, the time between identifying the gap and 
the completion of the initiation phase ranged from one to four years (Table 4). Whereas 
negotiations at ServiceCorp and MetalCorp proceeded rather quickly, negotiations lasted 
for about three years in the case of ResourceCorp. However, duration may be affected by 
events outside of the negotiation process as in the case of ChemCorp case, where nego-
tiations were drawn out by a major restructuring. 
An important procedural factor (raised by management) is the question of labour’s 
representation at the bargaining table. For example, the managements of both 
ResourceCorp and ChemCorp strictly opposed the participation of home country 
national unions. In contrast, at MetalCorp, the IMF had to abide by management’s 
refusal to accept an external organization at the bargaining table. Such policy decisions 
by management may complicate labour’s strategic goal of building the right kind of 
pressure for holding together the initiating actor constellation and at the same time 
promoting a constructive bargaining climate with management.6 These two require-
ments may be highly contradictory as management might balk at negotiating an IFA 
under external pressure. 
Regarding the substance of IFAs, there are basically two issues of controversy that are 
characteristic of negotiations. One is the acceptance by management of union recogni-
tion clauses beyond general value-loaded statements on industrial democracy, collective 
bargaining, and social dialogue inserted into preambles: Almost one-half of the IFAs in 
our sample contain no more than explicit reference to the ILO Conventions 87 and 98 
(ResourceCorp). Some 40 percent go a step further, committing management to strict 
neutrality during organization drives and prohibiting any interference or retaliatory 
measures (ChemCorp), and in 12 percent of IFAs, management support for union organ-
izing attempts is prescribed. For example, MetalCorp commits itself to guaranteeing 
collective bargaining and union recognition even in countries where national regulations 
do not meet its home country standards. Although basically oriented toward neutrality, 
ServiceCorp is also exceptional on this point. In an attempt to curb unfair competition 
from low-cost service providers in its industry, it has agreed to contribute a substantial 
sum to a jointly managed union-organizing fund. 
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The coverage of suppliers by the IFA is equally controversial. Extending the agree-
ment throughout the global production network, especially to the periphery, is under-
standably a top priority of all GUFs. In contrast, management respondents in all four 
cases point to the limits of their legal responsibility by highlighting the unclear formal 
status of the agreement, especially in regard to international labour law and to its exten-
sion to other legal entities such as independent suppliers. As the HR manager of 
ResourceCorp argued, the economic rationale for foreign investment strategies of reduc-
ing labour costs and for outsourcing to business partners is questioned if standards of the 
TNC are extended to suppliers as well. MetalCorp too adamantly defended its preroga-
tive to choose its business partners. But at the same time, it acknowledged responsibility 
for ensuring that all parts of the final product are produced under acceptable labour 
standards. In the case of ResourceCorp dissension on this issue impeded the progress of 
the initiation process, whereas in the other three cases, disagreement was overcome by a 
commitment on both sides to dialogue and pragmatic solutions.
Decision to transfer: How to transfer and monitor the practice 
The outcome of negotiation is crucial for this third sub-stage, in which core elements of 
the transfer of practice, i.e. implementation, monitoring, and boundary definition, need 
to be specified in order to prescribe a viable mechanism of conflict resolution in the IFA. 
We first address the measures and instruments by which management intends to imple-
ment the results as negotiated. Second, we look at the procedures for jointly monitoring 
the agreement. Third, we examine the scope of the agreement within the global produc-
tion network in terms of the organizational units covered. 
First of all, for IFA implementation, management uses well established CSR measures 
such as internal reporting requirements, audits and self-checks, target agreements, com-
pliance guidelines in manager contracts, sourcing specifications, leadership training 
seminars, etc. By these means, management strives to complement other processes 
within an already established (inter-)organizational structure used to ensure process sta-
bility in global production networks (cf. Edwards et al., 1999; Ferner et al., 2004). 
However, TNCs with IFAs differ considerably in regard to external actor involvement in 
decision-making on implementation measures. Those with an integrated CSR approach, 
such as ServiceCorp, consult directly with labour on a regular basis in the interest of a 
global strategy on labour relations. In contrast, those TNCs with a more voluntaristic 
approach to CSR (e.g. ResourceCorp), restrict union involvement to informal and unfo-
cused consultation within bodies such as a sustainability stakeholder council. ChemCorp, 
which undertakes yearly joint fact finding missions with ICEM to subsidiaries, and 
MetalCorp, are representative of those TNCs with a cooperative style of labour relations, 
integrating, for example, labour standards into management manuals for auditing busi-
ness processes and standards, or including such standards in performance measurements 
for local managers and factory supervisors. In addition, MetalCorp has decided to intro-
duce a jointly organized hotline at HQ as a formal complaint procedure involving both 
parties in the handling of individual complaints. Interestingly, in all four cases union 
representatives as well as managers consider IFAs as a means for enhancing the monitor-
ing capacities of the TNC and its global production network.
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Second, in our sample of 72 IFAs, we can distinguish two basic forms of conflict reso-
lution in the organization of monitoring, depending on the extent of institutionalization: 
(1) highly institutionalized forms of monitoring IFAs that involve a specially designated 
body or a European or world works council, and (2) weaker forms relying on ‘meetings’. 
With the latter, future replication of negotiations – and hence the transfer of practices – 
rests more on goodwill and informal relationships and commitment than a formally 
agreed procedure. Across all IFAs, the number of TNCs without an organization-wide 
rule for reporting any violation of labour standards and with ‘meetings’ as the mode of 
formal monitoring is considerably high (41.2%). Where GUFs need to use the influence 
of the European Works Council or the works council for opening the initiation phase, we 
find that monitoring gives this body formal recognition (e.g. MetalCorp). Where only 
GUFs have been directly involved in the process, monitoring is assigned to ‘meetings’, 
a significantly less institutionalized and ad hoc form of conflict resolution (ResourceCorp, 
ServiceCorp, ChemCorp). 
Nevertheless, this finding needs to be interpreted in conjunction with an overall 
assessment of implementation and monitoring procedures as they are continually devel-
oping. For example, the ChemCorp IFA refers only to meetings for consultation on 
alleged violations, but as noted above, the actual practice of joint audits with the ICEM 
at production facilities and ICEM’s involvement in the operation of a hotline are indica-
tions of a stronger institutionalization. In contrast, ServiceCorp and ResourceCorp lack 
a hotline and rely only on meetings for monitoring.7
Finally, in regard to the definition of the IFA’s boundaries, as we reported above, the 
extension to suppliers throughout the global production network is highly controversial. 
This is reflected in our content analysis of 72 IFAs, which shows that in 44 percent of 
them, suppliers are either not mentioned or are referred to only in conjunction with vol-
untary measures such as workshops and discussions on compliance. Such voluntary 
forms of integrating suppliers are to be found where IFA monitoring is weakly institu-
tionalized; in contrast, some form of sanction is much more likely in IFAs with more 
institutionalized forms of monitoring. We also found that the inclusion of an individual 
complaint procedure (often a management-promoted instrument) goes along with a 
stronger integration of suppliers in terms of sanctions against failure to comply with 
IFAs’ standards.
Viability of conflict resolution: Evaluation of initiation outcomes 
The focus of this article is on the initiation phase of the transfer process. Although we 
lack, at present, sufficient empirical evidence to address the subsequent phase of imple-
mentation (not to mention ramp-up and integration), we are well aware of the intrinsic 
connection between initiation and implementation and of the need for its close examina-
tion. However, we are able to add to an understanding of the initiation phase by briefly 
reviewing assessments from our respondents regarding the handling of the first reported 
cases of alleged violations and implementation problems. For HQ level actors, such 
case-handling in the context of monitoring procedures is a crucial element for judging 
the process of implementation and whether the transfer of practices has been success-
fully initiated in terms of necessary replication.
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Our data show that alleged violations of labour standards have been reported for many 
different countries, including those in our research focus: Brazil, India, Turkey, and the 
USA. Interestingly, the most frequent ones concern avoidance of union recognition and 
collective bargaining in the USA. By contrast, violation reports from Brazil have been 
rare and with reference to less serious infringements (undue wage cuts, unjustified dis-
missals, conflict between different local unions, unconfirmed cases of child labour). 
Similar cases are reported from Turkey, while the cases from India include very severe 
violations (violence against workers and their representatives, child labour). In reference 
to the problems of implementation, explanations for such violations include the fluidity 
and complexity of operations in global production networks, the number of subsidiaries, 
suppliers and sub-contractors, and the diversity of country-specific institutional settings. 
Labour representatives pointed to management failures to provide adequate manpower 
and financial resources for implementation, but also to their own lack of such resources. 
For management, such criticisms were often regarded as being exaggerated.
Among our four cases, ResourceCorp, with its weak monitoring provisions, appears 
to have the greatest problems of implementation, most of which concern the highly con-
troversial issue of the extension to suppliers. Reports of violations do reach the HQ level, 
but management consistently rejects responsibility for legally independent entities. 
According to the GUFs, these are the product of out-sourcing decisions by ResourceCorp 
itself. We interpret the situation at ResourceCorp as an indication of the problems associ-
ated with a conflict resolution mechanism that entirely relies on informal procedures. 
Moreover, this case clearly shows how the differences and conflicts that were already 
evident in earlier sub-stages of the initiation phase turn out to be almost insurmountable 
in the face of violation reports at the supplier level.
By comparison, the implementation problems at ChemCorp, ServiceCorp, and 
MetalCorp have been reported to be much less severe. At MetalCorp, a fairly high 
number of cases have been reported, including some from its home country, but with the 
exception of one case that is still pending, all have been resolved consensually by fol-
lowing the formal IFA procedure. For employee representatives at MetalCorp HQ, who 
led the initiation process on labour’s side, the greatest obstacle to implementation has 
been the critical stance toward IFAs adopted by US metalworking unions (Herrnstadt, 
2007). Regarding the issue of boundary definition, the extension to suppliers has been 
re-negotiated, linking the IFA to the regular sourcing procedures and assigning the 
responsible sourcing manager to the team for handling reported violations on the opera-
tional level.
Despite the apparent reluctance on the part of US management to negotiate with local 
unions, violations have yet to be reported formally to the HQ level of ChemCorp. In the 
views of both management and the GUF, this might be explained by the effectiveness of 
periodic fact-finding missions to subsidiary sites. Like MetalCorp, ChemCorp has estab-
lished a working social dialogue to improve continuously the IFA, for example, through 
the recent agreement on a global safety committee (covering suppliers as well).
Given the overall poor employment standards in the industry, it seems somewhat 
surprising that no violations have been reported to ServiceCorp HQ. Since this firm has 
over 400,000 employees at more than 60 locations around the world, we would argue 
that this is more likely indicative of inadequate implementation and monitoring rather 
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than of an efficient policy of prevention. Indeed, both management of ServiceCorp and 
UNI agree on the labour standards problems in the industry, and seem determined to 
cooperate in addressing them. Three years after the signing of the original agreement it 
has been successfully re-negotiated, with management agreeing to facilitate union organ-
izing efforts as long as UNI and its affiliates promise to use the specified conflict resolu-
tion procedure and not to publicize problems. Moreover, management reserves the right 
to recognize unions that are not affiliated with UNI. 
Discussion and conclusion
In this article, we have extended the model of practice transfer developed by Szulanski 
(1996, 2000) in order to investigate how employment-related practice transfer within 
TNCs and their global production networks is initiated under the condition of external 
actor involvement. Interpreted within an extended model of practice transfer, our find-
ings contribute to a theory of IHRM that looks not only at structural or political aspects 
but, in line with Giddens’ (1984) theory of structuration, at their recursive interplay for 
explaining practice transfer and diffusion in TNCs (see also Edwards et al., 1999). On the 
one hand, our findings extend previous analyses of IFAs as a policy instrument of organ-
ized labour by explicitly looking at the organizational and inter-organizational processes 
on the management side. On the other hand, we go beyond earlier studies in IHRM by 
making external actor involvement in the initiation phase of the transfer of practice 
explicit. Moreover, our findings push the boundary of traditional IHRM beyond the sin-
gle enterprise by acknowledging the basic configuration of global production networks 
as a relevant background condition for the active dissemination of decent labour stand-
ards to the level of suppliers. As a welcome side-effect, our research brings labour and its 
collective representation ‘back in’ to the debate on the governance of networks. The issue 
of an active role for labour is rarely found in studies of inter-organizational networks 
from a management and organization perspective (see, for recent reviews, Borgatti and 
Foster, 2003; Provan et al., 2007). This also holds for research on global value chains in 
political science (Bair, 2008; Gereffi et al., 2005) and on global production networks by 
economic geographers (Coe et al., 2008; Nadvi, 2008). 
In addition to that, we provide insights into the details of the process of initiating 
practice transfer. Using IFAs as an example, we can provide evidence on how external 
actor involvement can affect all stages of the initiation phase: initiatives to ‘find the gap’; 
negotiation as an additional process step; and the mutual agreement on transfer. And we 
have pointed to union recognition and the extension of the scope of the IFA to suppliers 
as being the main issues of controversy. In so doing, we have brought additional sources 
of stickiness to light beyond those already identified in Szulanski’s model, showing for 
example how labour’s input and its organizational constellation affect negotiations and 
their outcomes, and impacts the scope of the agreement and its later implementation. 
We have emphasized the role of labour as the initiator of the IFA process. Nevertheless, 
labour’s organizational heterogeneity is indicative of the challenges it faces to find and 
articulate a common strategy, an issue of crucial importance beyond the policy field of 
IFAs (Hyman, 2005), but which cannot be addressed in this article. The existence of 
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a stable coalition among GUF representatives, national unions, and works councils facil-
itates negotiations, and seems to have a positive impact on the type of monitoring embod-
ied in an IFA. Moreover, our results are a strong indication that HQ level unions and 
employee representatives play a crucial role as gatekeepers and in advancing labour’s 
interest in effective instruments for implementation and monitoring. In contrast, cases in 
which a stable coalition on labour’s side between GUFs, national unions at HQ, and 
employee representative bodies was not forged, monitoring procedures remain informal 
and unstable. 
According to our results, the viability of the conflict resolution mechanism strongly 
depends on its institutionalization and (inter-)organizational embeddedness. The greater 
the institutionalization of monitoring mechanisms and implementation measures, the 
more likely it is that an IFA will also cover suppliers and feedback complaints of viola-
tion into HQ level case handling. This is exemplified by the four cases that we presented 
in more detail. Nevertheless, this institutionalization at the top may be inadequate in 
global production networks that are more heterarchical and, at least at their periphery, 
based on market-like subcontracting. In contrast to that, network-like, long-term obliga-
tional relationships may well be more apt to facilitate the transfer of labour standards 
than market relationships (Fichter and Sydow, 2002; Frenkel and Kim, 2004). In regard 
to IFAs, it seems that the presence of additional (external) actors tests HQ management’s 
capacity to reflect on the actual scope and form of its global production networks. In this 
respect, we found the inclusion of suppliers to be an issue for regulation in the greater 
majority of IFAs, but not in all of them. Even more importantly, the agreements embody 
three distinctly different approaches to dealing with conflicts arising over non-adherence 
to the IFA at a supplier: to ignore, to consider action (weak sanctions), or to act (strong 
sanctions).
The transfer of practices begins with the initiation phase, and we have shown how 
(global) unions as external actors impact this phase of the process. Clearly, the conditions 
of initiation are highly relevant for the subsequent phases of practice transfer. More 
detailed research is nevertheless needed to fully understand the complexity of the com-
plete process and the relationship of the phases to each other, as well as the outcomes it 
produces. Case studies of the transfer process in and across TNCs at the local level could 
provide an in-depth and more thorough understanding of the dynamics of implementa-
tion, ramp-up and integration under the conditions of external actor involvement in 
TNCs and their global production networks. One prominent issue would be the actual 
role of suppliers and subsidiaries. Some first tier suppliers (Frenkel and Kim, 2004; Xue, 
2008), but certainly not those at the periphery of global production networks (Stigzelius 
and Mark-Herbert, 2009), may need to be more than passive recipients of a top-down 
process of practice transfer for the goal of IFA implementation to be achieved. From first 
indications of disinterest and resistance from some local managers in our interviews, it 
seems necessary to find means for them to assume a more active part in the initiating 
(and implementing) of labour standards. The same is true with regard to the possibly 
active role of at least some subsidiaries of TNCs (most likely with a home base in conti-
nental Europe or Scandinavia, though arguably, HQ will keep the relational control 
over labour standards in those networks as well). Both phenomena also question the 
618  Human Relations 64(4)
top-down-approach of IFAs as negotiated formal solutions at HQ. In this respect the 
notion of ‘networking within hierarchy’ (Edwards et al., 1999; our emphasis), coined to 
express the interplay between structural aspects and political agency in TNCs, can and 
should be complemented by the notion of ‘networking across hierarchies’ that evidently 
requires other modes of coordination than hierarchical fiat when unions (and eventually 
suppliers) as external actors are involved. A test for the opportunities of these influences, 
however, requires a methodology that captures the ‘views from below’ (Ferner et al., 
2004: 370) – a step that is next on our research agenda. 
Notes
1. The core labour standards refer to the prohibition of child labour (ILO co. 138 and 182) and 
forced labour (ILO co. 29 and 105), to non-discrimination and equal pay (ILO co. 100 and 
111), and to freedom of association and collective bargaining (ILO co. 87 and 98).
2.	 These are: the International Metalworkers’ Federation (IMF), the International Federation of 
Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers’ Unions (ICEM), the Building and Wood Work-
ers’ International (BWI), and Union Network International (UNI).
3. On average, the corporations in our sample operate in 22 different international locations and 
employ a staff of ca. 95,000 people.
4. We found the diversity of the actor constellation and the strategic approach evident in these 
four cases confirmed by our other interviews as well. Significantly, in three quarters of the 
cases in our sample, national unions at the HQ level or a works council (or both) were co-
signatories. This would confirm the relevance of these intermediary actors (see also Hammer, 
2005; Tørres and Gunnes, 2003).
5. However, experts from other departments such as sourcing and CSR, as well as lawyers from 
the legal department, may also be involved.
6. While there are some scattered references in our interviews to local management – especially 
in the US – being a ‘stumbling block’ (ServiceCorp GUF rep) to the completion of IFA negotia-
tions, nowhere did we encounter a systematic approach to involve local managers, despite their 
importance for the later implementation process. Also for unions, we have not encountered 
involvement of local unions from relevant countries, except in rare cases in which unions from 
Brazil and the US have been present in the world works council structure (MetalCorp) or are 
reported to indirectly participate in negotiations by being asked for feedback (ResourceCorp).
7.	 The recent move at ServiceCorp to hold two meetings a year might be interpreted as an open-
ing toward more institutionalization as implementation progresses.
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